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ABSTRACT
On 1 April 2010 the South African Child Justice Act (CJA or the Act) 
commenced. The long title of the Act states, inter alia, that the purpose of the 
Act is ‘to establish a criminal justice system for children, who are in conflict 
with the law and are accused of committing offences, in accordance with 
the values underpinning the Constitution and the international obligations 
of the Republic’. The Act provides, inter alia, that a child who has committed 
any offence may be diverted from the criminal justice system. Case law 
has started emerging from South African courts dealing with some of the 
sections of the Act. The purpose of this article is to highlight how courts 
have interpreted or applied some of the sections of the Act.
1  Introduction
The crime rate in South Africa is very high. These crimes are committed 
by and against both adults and children. Some of the children who 
commit these offences are prosecuted and convicted.1 For example, 
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) reports in its 2013/2014 
annual report that during 2013/2014, 561 children were convicted 
of various offences.2 However, not all children who commit offences 
are prosecuted. Some children are diverted from the formal court 
procedures. This is done in terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 
(CJA or the Act), which came into force on 1 April 2010. For example, 
during 2012/2013, a total of 6  605 children, and during 2013/2014, 
6  352 children, were diverted in terms of the CJA.3 It is important 
* LLB Hons (Makerere) LLM (Pretoria) LLM (UFS) LLD (UWC), Associate Professor of 
Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape (UWC) and Research Fellow, 
Community Law Centre, UWC. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers and to 
Prof Israel Leeman (UWC) for their comments on the earlier draft of this article. The 
usual caveats apply. 
1 The Department of Correctional Services website shows that in 2012 there were 
over 500 children sentenced to prison in South Africa. See http://www.dcs.gov.za/
AboutUs/StatisticalInformation.aspx, accessed on 22 October 2014.
2 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Annual Report (NPA) 2013/2014 
(2014) 52, available at http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/NPA%20Annual%20
Report%20-%202014%20-%204th%20Draft.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2015. 
3 NPA Annual Report 2013/2014 op cit (n2) 51.
40
SACJ-2015-1-Text.indd   40 04/06/2015   13:23
to briefly deal with the history of the inclusion of the sections on 
diversion in the CJA. The earliest report, as far as the author could 
establish, in which the South African Law Commission (SALC) dealt 
with diversion was the issue paper entitled ‘Sexual Offences Against 
Children’ published in May 1997.4 In this report the Law Commission 
dealt with the advantages and disadvantages of diverting children 
who are alleged to have committed sexual offences from the criminal 
justice system.5 It is clear that the recommendations in the report were 
limited to children who had allegedly committed sexual offences. 
This approach was followed in the subsequent discussion paper.6 In 
the same year, the South African Law Commission published another 
report, in an issue paper, entitled ‘Juvenile Justice’, which dealt 
with diversion in detail.7 This issue paper dealt with juvenile justice 
comprehensively and diversion is dealt with in detail. The issue paper 
deals with the then South African practice on diversion (showing 
how many children were being diverted each year, the role players 
in the diversion programmes, the different diversion programmes, 
and the challenges faced in implementing those programmes);8 the 
international perspectives on diversion (here the report mentioned the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (‘The Beijing Rules’));9 and referrals.10 The most important 
recommendation made in the report is that diversion should be 
provided for in law and that legislation should ensure, inter alia, that 
the rights of children are respected in the implementation of diversion 
programmes.11 The issue paper on ‘Juvenile Justice’ was followed by 
the discussion paper on ‘Juvenile Justice’ of 1999.12 The discussion 
paper highlighted, inter alia, the fact that most respondents supported 
the introduction of legislation that would regulate all aspects of 
diversion in South Africa. The recommendations in the report were 
based on best practices from international law and countries such 
4 South African Law Commission (SALC) Issue Paper 10 (Project 108) ‘Sexual Offences 
Against Children’ (1997).
5 SALC Issue Paper 10 op cit (n4) at para 5.11.
6 See also South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 85 (Project 107) ‘Sexual 
Offences: The Substantive Law’ (1997) at para 3.6.2.2.
7 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 9 (Project 106) ‘Juvenile Justice’. (The 
date of publication is not mentioned in the report. However, the deadline for 
comments is mentioned as 31 August 1997.)
8 SALC Issue Paper 9 op cit (n7) at paras 7.1 – 7.8.
9 SALC Issue Paper 9 op cit (n7) at para 2.2.
10 SALC Issue Paper 9 op cit (n7) at ch 6.
11 SALC Issue Paper 9 op cit (n7) at paras 7.14 – 7.19.
12 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 79 (Project 106) ‘Juvenile Justice’ 
[1999].
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as New Zealand, Uganda and Scotland. This discussion paper was a 
clear indicator that legislation on diversion was in the process of being 
introduced in South Africa. The importance of diversion has featured 
in different issue papers or discussion papers published by the Law 
Commission dealing with issues such as sentencing,13 simplification of 
criminal procedure,14 sexual offences,15 and out of court settlements 
in criminal matters.16 The ‘Juvenile Justice’ discussion paper was the 
basis for the drafting of the CJA.17
Since the coming into force of the CJA, some scholars have written 
on various aspects of diversion, such as the National Director of Public 
Prosecution’s (NDPP) directives on diversion,18 the unexplained reasons 
for the decrease in the number of children being diverted from the criminal 
justice system,19 and the increased official interest in diversion.20 This 
author is not aware of any article or chapter in any book discussing the 
South African cases on diversion. South African courts have recognised 
the importance of the Child Justice Act in the criminal justice system. For 
example, in S v CKM21 the high court held that the Act:
‘[I]ntroduced a comprehensive system of dealing with child offenders and 
children coming into conflict with the law that represents a decisive break with 
the traditional criminal justice system. The traditional pillars of punishment, 
retribution and deterrence are replaced with continued emphasis on the 
need to gain understanding of a child caught up in behaviour transgressing 
the law by assessing her or his personality, determining whether the child is 
in need of care, and correcting errant actions as far as possible by diversion, 
13 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 94 (Project 73) ‘Simplification of 
Criminal Procedure (Sentence Agreements)’ [2001] 20. 
14 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 96 (Project 73) ‘Simplification 
of Criminal Procedure (A More Inquisitorial Approach to Criminal Procedure – 
Police Questioning, Defence Disclosure, the Role of Judicial Officers and Judicial 
Management of Trials)’ (The date of publication is not mentioned in the report. 
However, the deadline for comments is mentioned as 30 June 2001.) at para 3.18.
15 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) ‘Sexual Offences: 
Process and Procedure’ [2001] Vol 1 at paras 15.3.3 – 15.3.5.15.
16 South African Law Commission Project 73 ‘Sixth Interim Report on Simplification 
of Criminal Procedure Out of Court Settlements in Criminal Cases’ (2002) at paras 
2.9 – 2.26.
17 F du Bois Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9ed (2007) 175; A Skelton and 
C Frank ‘Conferencing in South Africa: Returning to our future’ in A Morris & 
G  Maxwell (eds) Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation and 
Circles (2001) 103 at 113 – 114.
18 N Murungi ‘An appraisal of the NDPP’s section 97(4) Directives of 2010’ (2011) 13 
Article 40, 9–11.
19 C Badenhorst ‘The Child Justice Act: What’s happening after two years?’ (2012) 14 
Article 40, 7 at 8.
20 SS Terblanche ‘The Child Justice Act: Procedural sentencing issues’ (2013) 16 PELJ 
321 at 322.
21 2013 (2) SACR 303 (GNP).
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community-based programmes, the application of restorative-justice 
processes and reintegration of the child into the community.’22
Section 1 of the CJA defines ‘diversion’ to mean ‘diversion of a matter 
involving a child away from the formal court procedures in a criminal 
matter by means of the procedures established by Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 8’. Section 51 of the Act gives the following as the objectives of 
diversion: deal with a child outside the formal criminal justice system 
in appropriate cases; encourage the child to be accountable for the 
harm caused by him or her; meet the particular needs of the individual 
child; promote the reintegration of the child into his or her family and 
community; provide an opportunity to those affected by the harm to 
express their views on its impact on them; encourage the rendering to 
the victim of some symbolic benefit or the delivery of some object as 
compensation for the harm; promote reconciliation between the child 
and the person or community affected by the harm caused by the child; 
prevent stigmatising the child and prevent the adverse consequences 
flowing from being subject to the criminal justice system; reduce the 
potential for re-offending; prevent the child from having a criminal 
record; and promote the dignity and well-being of the child, and the 
development of his or her sense of self-worth and ability to contribute 
to society. In S v Gani NO, the court observed that:
‘The objectives of diversion are set out very clearly in s 51 of the Act. It 
is now incumbent on the criminal justice system, including the presiding 
officers, to give consideration to the objectives of diversion and to remove 
children from the system where appropriate. The jurisdictional principles to 
be applied are clearly set out.’23
The court added that ‘[t]he statutory introduction by parliament of a 
new approach to the criminal jurisprudence pertaining to children 
makes it peremptory that provisions of the Act be applied’.24 The court 
held that diversion is in line with section 28 of the Constitution, which 
recognises the best interests of the child.25 There are three situations in 
which a child in conflict with the law can be diverted. First, diversion 
22 S v CKM supra (n21) at para [7].
23 2012 (2) SACR 468 (GSJ) at para [18].
24 S v Gani supra (n23) at para [20].
25 In De Vos NO v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 (1) SACR 
18 (WCC) at para [57], that court held that ‘The diversion options set out in s 53 of 
the CJA are available even in the case of children who are found to have committed 
crimes that fall within sch 2 to the CJA, which includes murder, culpable homicide, 
rape and compelled rape. Through s 53 of the CJA, the legislature has afforded 
courts a wide discretion to deal with child offenders in many different ways that 
give effect to the right in s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution, to resort to incarceration 
only as a means of last resort, and in so doing enable courts to give effect to the 
injunction in s 28(2) to act at all times in the best interests of the child.’
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by a prosecutor when a child is alleged to have committed a minor 
offence – an offence referred to in schedule 1 to the Act (section 41); 
diversion by a prosecutor when the child is alleged to have committed 
a serious offence – an offence referred to in schedule 2 to the Act 
(section 52(2)); and diversion at the indication of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) when the child is alleged to have committed a 
very serious offence – an offence referred to in schedule 3 to the Act 
(section 52(3)). A child justice court may also divert a matter on an 
application by a prosecutor or the DPP (section 67). Statistics from the 
National Prosecuting Authority show that the majority of children have 
been diverted after preliminary inquiries.26 The inclusion of diversion 
in the CJA is in line with international human rights practice. The 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring 
body of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which South 
Africa has ratified, has called upon countries to include diversion in 
their criminal justice systems.27 South African case law shows that 
even before the CJA was enacted, some prosecutors diverted some 
children from the criminal justice system.28 Service providers such as 
the National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders also worked hand in hand with prosecutors to implement 
diversion programmes before the CJA was enacted,29 and thousands 
26 For example, between 2012 and 2014, 3 864 children were diverted on in terms 
of section 41; 7 848 children were diverted after a preliminary inquiry; and 310 
children were diverted by the Director of Public Prosecutions (schedule 3 offences). 
See National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (n2) 52. 
27 See, for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child’s concluding observations 
on the combined third and fourth periodic report of Cyprus, CRC/C/CYP/CO/3-4, 15 
June 2012 para 55(c); Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘Concluding observations 
on second periodic report of Mali’, CRC/C/MLI/CO/2, 2 February 2007 para 71(b); 
concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘Concluding 
observations: Republic of Korea on the consolidated third and fourth periodic 
reports of the Republic of Korea’ CRC/C/KOR/CO/3-4, 6 October 2011 para 81(e); 
‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Malta’ adopted by the 
Committee at its sixty-second session CRC/C/MLT/CO/2, 14 January – 1 February 
2013, para 66(e).
28 See, for example, S v EA 2014 (1) SACR 183 (NCK) in which the accused was diverted 
in early 2009 and completed the diversion programme. The court held that although 
at the time he was diverted there was no law in place governing diversion, it would 
be unfair to prosecute him for the same crime after he had successfully participated 
in the diversion programme. S v Zen 1999 (1) SACR 427 (E); S v Cotyi [2005] JOL 
14810 (E) (and the cases discussed therein); and S v Zingela; Gelebe; Nyila; Magi; 
Mngomezulu [1999] JOL 4536 (E). (The high court refers to the diversion guidelines 
developed by the Attorney-General of the Eastern Cape.)
29 See LM Muntingh and R Shapiro (eds) NICRO Diversion Options (1997), available at 
www.nicro.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/1997-Diversion-Options.pdf, accessed 
on 13 February 2015.
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of children were diverted.30 However, this practice did not have legal 
backing and the CJA had to be enacted. In S v EA the high court held 
that ‘[a]lthough juvenile offenders have been diverted on a regular 
basis prior to the commencement of the Child Justice Act, there was 
no legislation that regulated the process’.31 The purpose of this article 
is to highlight South African cases on some of the provisions of the 
CJA. It should be noted at the outset that very few cases on diversion 
have been reported in South African law reports. This could be 
attributed to the fact that most of the diversion cases are dealt with 
by lower courts (regional and district courts), which are not courts of 
record.32 All the cases that are dealt with in this article, apart from 
one Constitutional Court case, are high court cases. This article will 
highlight the principles that have emerged from these cases.
2  Emerging jurisprudence on diversion
All the cases discussed in this article deal with children who were or 
were not diverted after the commencement of the CJA. The CJA, as the 
high court correctly observed, ‘has no retrospective provision’.33 What 
follows highlights these cases and the issues with which the courts 
have dealt.
2.1  Exposing a diverted child to the criminal justice system
As mentioned earlier, section 1 of the CJA defines ‘diversion’ to mean 
‘diversion of a matter involving a child away from the formal court 
procedures in a criminal matter by means of the procedures established 
by Chapter 6 and Chapter 8’, and one of the objectives of diversion 
is to deal with a child outside the formal criminal justice system in 
appropriate cases. One of the objects of the CJA is to prevent children 
from being exposed to the adverse effects of the formal criminal justice 
system.34 As the National Prosecuting Authority states, when children 
are diverted, ‘[t]hey are offered an opportunity to change their lives 
instead of going deeper in the criminal justice system and become 
hardened criminals’.35 However, this does not mean that the child who 
is suspected of breaking the law will not, for example, be arrested or 
30 JM Reyneke and RP Reyneke ‘Process and best practice at the Mangaung One-Stop 
Child Justice Centre’ (2011) 24 SACJ 137 at 154.
31 S v EA supra (n28) at para [5].
32 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (n2) 51.
33 S v EA supra (n28) at para [4].
34 Section 2(d) of the Child Justice Act.
35 The National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa ‘Child Justice’, available at http://
www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent414.aspx, accessed on 15 February 2015.
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served a summons for the purpose of prosecuting him. In Teddy Bear 
Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (Justice Alliance of South Africa as amici curiae),36 a 
case that did not deal directly with the issue of diversion but rather 
with the constitutionality of the sections of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act37 that criminalised 
consensual sexual intercourse between children, the applicants 
argued that the sections were unconstitutional for violating different 
rights of the children. The respondents argued, inter alia, that the 
existence of the option of diversion saved the impugned provisions.38 
The Constitutional Court per Khampepe J held that:
‘I find myself constrained to agree with the applicants that even the prospect 
of diversion cannot save the impugned provisions. If the adolescent charged 
under section 15 or section 16 is ultimately diverted from the formal criminal 
justice system, he or she may still be arrested and forced to interact with 
arresting and investigating police officials. If the adolescent is to avoid a 
formal criminal trial, he or she must acknowledge “responsibility for the 
offence” to a magistrate. The acknowledgement is made during inquiry or 
trial proceedings at which various people may be in attendance, including 
the adolescent’s guardian, the relevant probation officer and the prosecutor. 
The adolescent will not only experience these interactions with various 
institutions of state, but in the course thereof will be forced to disclose and 
have scrutinised details of his or her intimate affairs.’39
The Court added that:
‘The respondents rely extensively on the prosecutorial discretion and 
diversion measures in other relevant legislation to justify the limitation of 
the aforementioned rights. However, as already explained, these temper only 
some of the harm. Adolescents would still be exposed to earlier processes in 
the criminal justice system such as being arrested and questioned by police 
and other authorities about their intimate sexual behaviour. A prosecutor 
choosing to act with circumspection does not do enough to alleviate the 
invasion of children’s rights occasioned by those earlier processes.’40
At the heart of the inquiry was whether the possibility of diversion could 
save the impugned provisions from being declared unconstitutional. 
In the above judgment, the Constitutional Court, although it was not 
called upon to deal directly with the issue of diversion, makes it very 
clear that the possibility of diversion does not prevent a child from 
being in contact with law enforcement officers or the prosecutor, but 
36 2013 (12) BCLR 1429 (CC).
37 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007.
38 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children supra (n36) at para [32].
39 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children supra (n36) at para [74].
40 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children supra (n36) at para [83].
46 SACJ . (2015) 1
SACJ-2015-1-Text.indd   46 04/06/2015   13:23
can prevent detention awaiting trial, trial, and imprisonment, in case 
of a conviction.
2.2  The lawfulness of a diversion order
The principle of legality is emphasised in South African law. It requires, 
inter alia, that actions taken by public officials must be based on the 
relevant legal provisions.41 The necessary legal requirements have to 
be complied with for the diversion order to be valid. As mentioned 
earlier, section 52(3)(a) of the CJA provides that
‘The Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction may, in the case of 
an offence referred to in Schedule 3, in writing, indicate that the matter be 
diverted if exceptional circumstances exist, as determined by the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions in directives…’
In S v Sobekwa,42 the accused who was 17 years old, was charged 
before a magistrate’s court with armed robbery. Armed robbery 
is one of the offences provided for in schedule 3 to the Act. He 
appeared before a magistrate for a preliminary inquiry, after which 
the magistrate ordered that the matter should be diverted.43 On 
review, the magistrate conceded that she had ‘misdirected herself in 
this regard’.44 The high court referred to section 52(3) of the CJA45 
and held that ‘[i]t is common cause that there has not been such a 
written indication by the D[irector] [of] P[ublic] P[rosecutions], and the 
diversion was accordingly wrongly ordered’.46 The court concluded 
that ‘[t]he order for diversion is hereby set aside and the matter is 
remitted to the court a quo for inquiry in terms of section 43 of the 
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008’.47
As mentioned earlier, under section 41 of the CJA, a prosecutor is 
empowered to divert a matter before a preliminary inquiry. Under 
section 52(1)(e) a matter may only be diverted if, inter alia, ‘the 
prosecutor indicates that the matter may be diverted in accordance 
with subsection (2) or the Director of Public Prosecutions indicates 
that the matter may be diverted in accordance with subsection (3)’. The 
question that arises is whether the CJA is capable of being interpreted 
to allow a child’s lawyer to make an application for the matter to 
41 See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 
(SCA).
42 [2013] JOL 30901 (ECG).
43 S v Sobekwa supra (n42) at para [1].
44 S v Sobekwa supra (n42) at para [4].
45 S v Sobekwa supra (n42) at para [2].
46 S v Sobekwa supra (n42) at para [3].
47 S v Sobekwa supra (n42) at para [6(a)].
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be diverted. In Rabupape v S,48 the accused, a 16-year-old boy, was 
charged with culpable homicide in that he drove a car negligently and 
recklessly and without a licence, leading to the death of one of the 
passengers in the car with which he collided.49 The accused’s lawyer 
brought an application for diversion, which was supported by the 
Probation Officer but opposed by the prosecution.50 The magistrate 
invoked section 69(1) of the CJA and referred the accused for diversion. 
The matter was postponed for about three months ‘for [an] assessment 
report and to see if the accused complied with the diversion program’.51 
The state opposed the diversion order and submitted that the child had 
committed a serious offence and ‘that the magistrate acted ultra vires 
in diverting the matter for the child to attend a life skills program’.52 
It is against that background that the matter was referred to the high 
court for review.53 The high court referred to section 52 of the CJA and 
held that:
‘[8]  It is clear from the record that the application for diversion was instituted 
by the defence. It appears that the presiding officer was persuaded by 
the defence’s submission that the child acknowledged responsibility 
for the offence. Notwithstanding the public prosecutor’s opposition 
thereto, the presiding officer ordered for diversion without considering 
the provisions of the Act. In my view, the presiding officer misdirected 
himself by accepting the child’s acknowledgement of responsibility for 
the offence without considering the provisions of section 52(1)(e). Put 
differently, the presiding officer erred and acted irregularly.
[9] Further thereto, the prosecutor may, in the case of an offence referred 
to in Schedule 2,3 after he/she has considered the views of the victim 
or any person who has a direct interest in the affairs of the victim, 
may indicate whether or not the matter should be diverted. There is no 
evidence of either the deceased’s family or any person with direct interest 
in the affairs of the deceased or of the police official responsible for 
the investigation of the matter demonstrating that they were consulted 
before diverting the matter. The evidence on record is just that of the 
prosecutor opposing diversion. The diversion ordered by the presiding 
officer is, on this leg as well, irregular.’54
It is against that background that the high court set aside the order of 
diversion that had been made by the magistrate and referred the matter 
to ‘the Child Justice Court for the minor child to face the full might of 
48 Unreported (A907/2014) [2014] ZAGPPHC 948 (2 December 2014).
49 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at para [2].
50 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at para [3].
51 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at para [3].
52 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at para [4].
53 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at para [4].
54 Rabupape v S supra (n48) at paras [8]–[9].
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the law’.55 It is clear that a child’s lawyer may not apply for diversion. 
This can only be done by the prosecutor or by the DPP. Although a child 
justice court may divert a matter, it can only do so after an application 
by the prosecutor or the Director of Public Prosecutions.56 Although the 
high court takes issue with the fact that there was no evidence that the 
relatives of the deceased were consulted before the matter was diverted, 
it should be recalled that the prosecutor is not obliged to consult them. 
The word ‘may’ is used in section 52, which means that the prosecutor 
has the discretion whether or not to consult with them. It is submitted 
that if he does not consult them, he should explain the basis of his 
decision to the magistrate so that it is put on record. What is not clear 
from the facts of the case is whether the child had already complied 
with the diversion order. The issue of whether or not it is permissible 
for a child who has complied with a diversion order to be prosecuted is 
discussed below.
2.3  Is a preliminary inquiry mandatory in all diversion 
situations?
As mentioned earlier, there are four situations in which a matter may 
be diverted – diversion by a prosecutor when a child has committed a 
minor offence (schedule 1); diversion by a prosecutor when a child has 
committed a serious offence (schedule 2); diversion at the indication 
of the DPP (schedule 3); and diversion by a court (section 67). In S v 
Ngubeni,57 the child was convicted of theft of chocolate worth R59,97. 
At his trial he was not represented by a lawyer and ‘[d]uring mitigation 
of sentence it was ascertained that the accused was 16 years old’.58 The 
magistrate only realised that the accused was a minor after conviction. 
As a result the ‘magistrate set aside his conviction and noted a plea of 
not guilty’.59 On review, the high court set aside all the proceedings in 
the magistrate’s court and held that:
‘In terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, the child must attend a 
preliminary enquiry [sic] to assess whether the child can be diverted from 
the criminal justice system. The magistrate directed that the child be sent to 
Protea Magistrate’s Court for this assessment.’60
In the above judgment the court does not refer to the relevant provision 
of the Act that makes it mandatory for a child to attend a preliminary 
55 Rabupape v S, supra (n48) at para [15].
56 See s 67 of the Child Justice Act.
57 2014 (1) SACR 266 (GSJ).
58 S v Ngubeni supra (n57) at para [2].
59 S v Ngubeni supra (n57) at para [2].
60 S v Ngubeni supra (n57) at para [4].
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inquiry for an assessment to be made of whether or not the child should 
be diverted from the criminal justice system. It should be noted that it 
is not a requirement that a preliminary inquiry has to be conducted in 
all cases before a child is diverted from the criminal justice system. A 
preliminary inquiry is only mandatory in respect of two of the three 
options. The matter could have been diverted without a preliminary 
inquiry being conducted. This is so because section 41(2)(c) of the Act 
read with schedule 1 provides that a prosecutor may divert a matter 
where the child has committed theft ‘where the amount involved does 
not exceed R2 500’ and that such diversion ‘must take place before a 
preliminary inquiry’. Therefore, it is not a requirement under the Act 
that for every matter to be diverted the child must attend a preliminary 
inquiry. In S v CKM 61 the court observed that:
‘Diversion of children into approved programmes enjoys great importance. 
The prosecution can divert children into approved programmes in 
appropriate circumstances after assessment by a probation officer, which 
must be effected before a decision concerning the potential diversion can be 
taken. Children who are not diverted by the prosecutor and who are older 
than 10 years…must appear at a preliminary inquiry, conducted before a 
magistrate inquisitorially to consider the probation officer’s report and to 
establish whether diversion is possible in the individual case.’62
It is argued that in the above quotation the court’s interpretation of 
relevant provisions of the Act seems to suggest that before a prosecutor 
makes a decision on whether or not to divert a child from the criminal 
justice system, an assessment by a probation officer is a prerequisite. 
It should be noted that section 41(2) of the CJA provides that one of 
the requirements that has to be met before a prosecutor diverts a child 
who has committed a minor offence is that the child has to be assessed 
by a probation officer.63 However, section 41(3) allows a prosecutor to 
dispense with the probation officer’s assessment. It states that
‘If the child has not been assessed, the prosecutor may dispense with the 
assessment if it is in the best interests of the child to do so: Provided that the 
reasons for dispensing with the assessment must be entered on the record of 
the proceedings by the magistrate in chambers…’
The above discussion shows, inter alia, that a preliminary inquiry is 
not a prerequisite before all matters are diverted from the criminal 
justice system.
61 S v CKM supra (n21).
62 S v CKM supra (n21) at paras [10]-[11].
63 Section 41(2)(b).
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2.4  Prosecuting a child against whom a diversion order has 
been made or who has complied with a diversion order
Section 59(1)(a) of the Act provides that ‘[i]f a matter has been 
diverted…and the diversion order has been successfully complied 
with, a prosecution on the same facts may not be instituted’. In S v 
Dwangu,64 the magistrate requested the high court to set aside the 
second accused’s conviction on the ground that he had been convicted 
of an offence notwithstanding the diversion order. The court held that:
‘We are not placed in possession of the full record or of the judgment but I 
am nevertheless satisfied that the prosecution against accused 2 continued 
notwithstanding the diversion order, resulting in his conviction. In terms of 
section 59(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 the further prosecution is 
prohibited. It follows that the conviction should be set aside against accused 2 
and that the matter should be remitted to the East London Regional Court.’65
The facts of the case are silent on whether the accused in question 
was still participating in the diversion programme in question or had 
successfully complied with the diversion order. However, what is clear 
is that the court confirms the principle that once a diversion order 
has been made and the accused is still participating in that order or 
has successfully complied with the order, he cannot be prosecuted on 
the basis of the same facts. In S v CKM,66 one minor had committed 
common assault and the other housebreaking to commit an unknown 
crime. They were diverted but later prosecuted because the first 
minor ‘had failed to attend any of the individual counselling sessions 
that formed part of the programme’67 and the second minor ‘failed 
to participate in a diversion programme’.68 The magistrate’s court 
committed them to a reformatory school. The high court set aside 
the magistrate’s orders because the magistrate in making the orders 
in question had not considered the personal circumstances of the 
accused and the principles applicable to sentencing juvenile offenders. 
However, the high court did not find that prosecuting children who 
have failed to successfully complete diversion programmes was not 
permissible. In S v EA, the court observed that ‘[i]n terms of s 59(1)
(a), which specifically deals with the legal consequences of a decision 
to divert an accused, a prosecution based on the same facts may 
not be instituted against an accused who has completed a diversion 
64 [2013] JOL 29977 (ECG).
65 S v Dwangu supra (n64) at para [2].
66 S v CKM supra (n21).
67 S v CKM supra (n21) at para [18].
68 S v CKM supra (n21) at para [23].
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programme successfully’.69 For a child who has been diverted to avoid 
prosecution, he must complete the diversion programme successfully.
2.5  Dealing with all child offenders under the Child Justice Act
One of the objects of the CJA is ‘[t]o establish a criminal justice system 
for children, who are in conflict with the law and are accused of 
committing offences, in accordance with the values underpinning the 
Constitution and the international obligations of the Republic’.70 The 
question which arises is whether all children who are in conflict with 
the law have to be dealt with under the CJA and if so, what are the 
legal implications for failure to deal with the child therein under. In 
S v Mthumeni,71 accused number two pleaded guilty and was convicted 
of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. Before imposing 
sentence, the magistrate realised that the accused was a minor – 17 
years old. His age had been correctly reflected on the charge sheet and 
he was represented by a lawyer at the trial. The high court, in setting 
aside the conviction and ordering that the case should be referred 
to the Child Justice Court, observed that the magistrate’s ‘failure to 
refer the accused person in question for an assessment prejudiced him 
because he was not dealt with in the manner envisaged by the Child 
Justice Act’.72 In S v Mbane,73 as in S v Mthumeni, the accused was 
17 years old, pleaded guilty, and was convicted of housebreaking with 
intent to steal and theft. He was also represented by a lawyer. At the 
commencement of the sentencing proceedings his attorney informed 
the court that the accused was a juvenile, aged 17.74 In setting aside 
the conviction, the court referred to the Constitution, the CJA and 
international human rights instruments75 and held that:
‘After accused 1 was arrested and later dealt with in terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 instead of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, in my 
view, he was denied the special justice dispensation provided for in the latter 
Act. In my view, that was a gross irregularity which has a great potential to 
result in a miscarriage of justice, and consequently this Court has an inherent 
jurisdiction to review these proceedings.’76
69 S v EA (n28) at para [4].
70 Long title of the Child Justice Act. 
71 [2013] JOL 30656 (ECG).
72 S v Mthumeni supra (n71) at para [4].
73 [2013] JOL 30083 (ECB).
74 S v Mbane supra (n73) at paras [2] and [4].
75 S v Mbane supra (n73) at para [7].
76 S v Mbane supra (n73) at para [8].
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The court ordered that the matter should be remitted to the magistrate’s 
court for the accused to be dealt with in terms of the CJA.77 The 
principle emerging from this jurisprudence is that children in conflict 
with the law should be dealt with in terms of the CJA. Failure to do so 
is an irregularity.
2.6  Is diversion possible after a child has been convicted?
Section 52(1) of the Act provides that ‘[a] matter may, after consideration 
of all relevant information presented at a preliminary inquiry, or during 
a trial, including whether the child has a record of previous diversions, 
be considered for diversion…’. As mentioned above, a child justice 
court may divert a matter in terms of section 67 if the prosecutor or 
DPP indicates that the matter must be diverted. Section 67 provides 
that if a child complies with a diversion order, the proceedings 
against him are stopped. The case of S v MK78 dealt with the correct 
interpretation of section 52(1) of the Act. The accused was 16 years 
old and was convicted on two counts of rape on the basis of his plea 
of guilty. He had raped two male minors. After conviction, the social 
worker presented a pre-sentence report in which he recommended 
that the court should order the accused to take part in some diversion 
programmes.79 In sentencing the accused to five years’ imprisonment, 
the magistrate held that he was ‘of the opinion that this [section of the 
Child Justice] Act is a diversion option which is available prior to a 
person being convicted’.80 The magistrate also held that ‘the seriousness 
of the crimes outweighed correctional supervision sentence options’ 
and that ‘there are sufficient youth prisons in South Africa that are 
more than equipped with dealing with the accused (sic) disorders as 
well as programmes to assist him’.81
On review, the high court held that ‘[t]he conviction of the accused 
is in order’.82 However, the court took issue with the sentence that 
was imposed and the interpretation that the magistrate gave to section 
52(1). It held that:
‘As to diversion, it is at the outset necessary to consider the provisions 
of s 52(1) of the Act, which provides as follows: “(1) A matter may, after 
consideration of all relevant information presented at a preliminary enquiry, 
or during a trial, including whether the child has a record of previous 
diversions, be considered for diversion if … .” [Emphasis added.] As is made 
77 S v Mbane supra (n73) at para [11].
78 2012 (2) SACR 533 (GSJ).
79 S v MK supra (n78) at para [3].
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 S v MK supra (n78) at para [2].
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clear by the italicised portion of the section, the option of diversion can be 
considered at any time during the trial. The regional magistrate, accordingly, 
wrongly jettisoned the option of diversion, resulting in a misdirection which, 
undoubtedly, seriously prejudiced the accused.’83
The court discussed the principles that are applicable to the sentencing 
of juvenile offenders and also the personal circumstances of the 
accused and held that:
‘[I]t is abundantly clear that the accused is in dire need of guidance, correction, 
rehabilitation and reintegration into his family and the community…Those 
objectives, which were seemingly ignored by the trial court…can best 
be achieved outside the prison environment…by providing appropriate 
alternative care. Direct imprisonment, exposing the accused to the many 
detrimental effects of incarceration…would merely be counter-productive to 
the prospects of rehabilitation…The sentence of five years’ imprisonment, 
accordingly, is strikingly inappropriate and therefore ought to be set aside.’84
The court observed further that:
‘The social worker’s recommendation…was that the accused be dealt with 
in terms of s 53(4)(c) and (d) of the Act, in the following manner: that he 
be detained at Sterkfontein Hospital for intensive therapy and treatment; 
that he thereafter be referred to and be ordered to attend sexual-offender 
programmes and, finally, that he be placed under the supervision of a 
probation officer for purposes of monitoring and follow-up…I am satisfied 
that the recommendation is in the best interests of the accused and that it 
ought to be implemented. In view, however, of the administrative and other 
requirements having to be complied with and to be provided for in the 
sentence to be imposed, I have decided to remit the matter to the trial court 
for imposing sentence afresh in the light of the findings I have made.’85
At least two important issues emerge from this case. First, the court 
makes it very clear that a juvenile offender can be diverted before and 
during the trial. This is what section 52(1) clearly states. Secondly, 
and rather controversially, the court holds that notwithstanding the 
fact that the accused had been convicted, he could still be ordered 
to participate in diversion programmes. The authors of one of the 
leading textbooks on the law of criminal procedure in South Africa 
are also of the view that the court’s reasoning is to the effect that a 
matter can be diverted during trial and after conviction.86 It should be 
recalled that the court held that the accused’s conviction was in order 
and did not set it aside. What it set aside was the sentence that had 
been imposed by the magistrate. It is submitted that once a child has 
been convicted of an offence and the conviction is not set aside, the 
83 S v MK supra (n78) at para [4].
84 S v MK supra (n78) at para [7].
85 S v MK supra (n78) at para [8].
86 J Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 11ed (2013) 81.
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relevant provisions of the CJA that deal with diversion cease to apply 
to that child. My submission is based on two factors. First, one of the 
objectives of diversion is to prevent a child from getting a criminal 
record. Once a child is convicted he automatically gets a criminal 
record. That criminal record would have to be expunged in terms of 
section 87 of the CJA.87 The second factor flows from the first – in cases 
where other magistrates have convicted children and a high court on 
review is of the view that diversion should have been considered, the 
convictions in question have been set aside and the cases remitted to 
the magistrates or to the Child Justice Court to deal with them in terms 
of the CJA. In S v Gani NO88 for example, the accused, a 17-year-old 
girl, was convicted of theft by the magistrate on the basis of her guilty 
plea. Before imposing sentence, the magistrate realised that she was a 
minor and her counsel submitted that she should have been diverted 
from the criminal justice system. It is against that background that 
the magistrate referred the matter to the high court for review. The 
high court observed that ‘the child has already been found guilty and 
diversion from the criminal justice system would require a setting-
aside of the conviction’.89 The court added that:
‘The question of diversion from the criminal justice system was not specifically 
addressed by the court a quo when the child’s plea of guilty was accepted. 
The input of a probation officer’s report would have been helpful at the point 
prior to the plea. The failure to consider diversion from the criminal justice 
system is of itself a fatal factor in the conviction process. The conviction 
cannot stand.’90
Because the child had a previous conviction for theft that had been 
suspended, the court held that:
‘This is the child’s second conviction. If the principle of diversion had been 
applied in relation to the first charge she could well have been diverted 
away from the criminal justice system at that stage. Two criminal convictions 
before reaching the age of 18 years is the very kind of problem which the 
Act aims to address. It is clear in my view that the court a quo must give 
consideration to diverting this child from the criminal justice system. The 
period of suspension for the first crime of theft is still current. The curatrix 
ad litem may want to revisit the first conviction as well in the light of this 
judgment.’91
87 For the law relating to the expungement of criminal records in South Africa, see JD 
Mujuzi ‘The expungement of criminal records in South Africa: The drafting history 
of the law, the unresolved issues, and how they could be resolved’ (2014) 35 Statute 
LR 278–303.
88 Supra (n23).
89 S v Gani NO supra (n23) at para [8].
90 S v Gani NO supra (n23) at para [13].
91 S v Gani NO supra (n23) at paras [15]–[16].
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One appreciates that the court in S v MK did not want the child in 
question to be sentenced to direct imprisonment. However, it is 
doubtful if it was the correct approach for the court to order that the 
magistrate should invoke section 53(4) of the CJA. In my opinion, the 
correct approach would have been for the court to order the magistrate 
to impose the suggested sentences on the basis of section 276 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, which allows a magistrate to impose sentences 
such as committing an offender to a treatment centre or to correctional 
supervision, as provided for in the CJA.92
2.7  Should all matters involving children be diverted?
As discussed above, children who have committed serious offences, 
such as rape, can also be diverted from the criminal justice system. 
However, in some instances courts have emphasised the seriousness 
of the offence, the child’s previous conviction or convictions, his 
previous diversion and the role he played in the commission of the 
offence to sentence the child to a lengthy term of imprisonment. For 
example, in S v Arends93, the three accused, including a 17-year-old, 
were prosecuted for rape and attempted robbery. Although the high 
court was aware of the fact that the first accused was 17 years old at 
the time he committed the offence, the issue of diversion was never 
raised during the trial. At sentencing, the court observed that:
‘Accused 1 was 17 years old when he committed the offences in this matter. 
He is not a first offender. He has previous convictions for theft and for 
housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. According to the probation 
officer’s report, the contents of which were admitted, accused 1 was also 
referred to a diversion program for another offence of housebreaking and 
for assault. He completed the program for these offences but defaulted in 
respect of the offences listed in his SAP69.’94
The court added that the accused’s mother’s statement that ‘he is an 
honest person who always tells the truth…must be treated sceptically 
in the light of the mendacious evidence he gave in this trial’.95 The 
court noted that the accused had been expelled from school without 
completing grade 3 and that he was not interested in going back to 
school.96 The court added that the probation officer’s view that the 
accused ‘may have been influenced by his co-accused to commit 
the offences of which he’ was convicted was not supported by any 
92 See ss 68–79 of the CJA.
93 Unreported [2010] ZAECGHC 16 (1 March 2010).
94 S v Arends supra (n93) at para [26].
95 S v Arends supra (n93) at para [27].
96 Ibid.
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evidence.97 The court emphasised the fact that the accused had played 
a leading, violent and active role in the commission of the offences.98 
The court concluded that:
‘Applying the approach to the sentencing of offenders younger than 
18 years…I am of the view that given the seriousness of the offences 
committed by accused 1 as well as the aggravating factors that I have listed, 
imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence for him. I am mindful too 
of the fact that I must sentence him to the shortest term of imprisonment 
that I can justify. In the circumstances that I have set out “and taking into 
account in particular the barbarity of his conduct” the sentence for the rape 
of necessity must be a long one. Given the role he played in the attempted 
robbery with aggravating circumstances, and his previous convictions are 
relevant in this regard, I am of the view that a shorter term of imprisonment, 
to run concurrently, is appropriate for this offence. On the rape conviction a 
sentence of 16 years imprisonment will achieve the balance required by the 
[Constitutional Court]…within the context of the balance of the interests of 
society, the nature and seriousness of accused 1’s crimes and his personal 
circumstances. A sentence of five years imprisonment in respect of the 
conviction of attempted robbery with aggravating circumstances is, in my 
view, appropriate.’99
It should be noted that although earlier on the court had referred 
to the fact that the accused had successfully completed a diversion 
programme, that fact was not emphasised when imposing the 
sentences in question. However, the court emphasised the accused’s 
previous convictions. This approach should be understood against the 
background that the CJA states expressly that ‘a diversion order does 
not constitute a previous conviction’.100 In S v Sekoere,101 the accused, 
a 17-year-old, was charged with a co-accused with the offence of 
housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. He was represented by 
a lawyer, pleaded guilty, and was convicted.102 After considering the 
probation officer’s pre-sentence report, which indicated, inter alia, 
that the accused had two previous convictions of housebreaking with 
intent to steal and theft and one conviction of escaping from custody, 
the magistrate sentenced the accused to 12 months’ imprisonment.103 
On review, although the high court referred to, inter alia, the relevant 
provisions of the CJA that deal with diversion,104 it concluded that 
in the light of the accused’s previous convictions and the existence 
97 S v Arends supra (n93) at para [28].
98 S v Arends supra (n93) at paras [28] and [36].
99 S v Arends supra (n93) at paras [37] – [38].
100 Section 59(1)(b).
101 2013 (2) SACR 426 (FB).
102 S v Sekoere supra (n101) at para [3].
103 S v Sekoere supra (n101) at para [4].
104 S v Sekoere supra (n101) at para [12].
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of several cases pending against him ‘[i]t was not in the interest of 
justice to impose any other sentence than that imposed by the court a 
quo…In the circumstances…the proceedings were in accordance with 
justice and that the sentence is in order’.105
3  Conclusion
The CJA empowers a prosecutor or the DPP to divert a matter from 
the criminal justice system. A matter may also be diverted by the 
Child Justice Court if the prosecutor or DPP indicates that it should be 
diverted. The purpose of this article was to highlight decisions of the 
South African courts in their interpretation of the CJA. It is of concern 
that there have been cases where the age of the child has either been 
incorrectly reflected on the charge sheet or the child’s correct age has 
only been established at the time of sentencing. This is disturbing 
especially in cases where some of the children were represented by 
lawyers at their trials. One would have expected any diligent lawyer to 
have established his client’s age at the time he is instructed, especially 
if there is reason to believe that he could be a minor. One would 
also have expected the prosecutor to know the age of the person he 
is to prosecute as this would enable him to determine whether or 
not diversion should be considered. It is also curious that in all the 
reported cases the child offenders pleaded guilty to the offences in 
question. The reasons for this are unclear. Some scholars are of the 
view that diversion is possible even after conviction. It is argued that 
once a child has been convicted the matter cannot be diverted from 
the criminal justice system. However, after conviction a judicial officer 
could impose a non-custodial sentence, or if necessary, commit a child 
to a treatment centre. On review, the high court has adopted two 
approaches in cases where it has set aside an incorrect diversion order. 
There are cases where the high court has ordered the matter to be 
remitted to the magistrate’s court to be dealt with in terms of the CJA, 
while in others it has ordered the matter to be referred to the Child 
Justice Court. It should also be noted that in many cases discussed in 
this article the child offenders were prosecuted together with adult 
co-accused. However, the cases do not reveal whether the magistrates 
considered the possibility of the children in question having been 
used or influenced by the adult co-accused to commit offences.
105 S v Sekoere supra (n101) at para [31].
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